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COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING THEORY AND THE URBAN 
RENEWAL PROGRAM IN CANADA 
Early in 1958, as a rather young planner, I represented the City of Calgary 
at a CMHC staff course on urban renewal. For a full month, in the depths of an 
Ottawa winter, we were exposed to a stream of "experts", American as well as 
Canadian, who gave us an exhaustive introduction to the theory and practice of 
urban renewal as it was then conceived. Although I could scarcely be aware of it 
at the time, Canadian planners were about to be engulfed in their most critical 
professional episode. For the first and onl_y_time~ planners across the country came/ 
to work under a degree of central direction in the service of a truly national 
--·---~- ~-------·--·~--------·------~·----
~r~g!"a.ID.· Moreover - and this was altogether more important from the standpoint of 
planning ideology - they were presented with their only opportunity to engage in 
"positive" planning on a national scale. The willingness of governments to become 
directly involved in the renewal of Canadian cities, and the promise of legislative 
authority and public funds that went along with that, all heralded the prospect that 
plans could be drafted with real assurance of being translated into action. ---------
In the upshot, the consequences for the planning profession were both good 
and bad. On the good side, an enormous amount of planning work was generated, 
for consultants as well as public agencies. Some 200 communities were subjected to 
close examination, most of them for the first time, and Canada's planners were 
<?n the bad side, the abrupt termination of the program in 1968, and the public . I I 
' ~. 
opprobrium to which it was then exposed, left the planners in a vulnerable position. 
As the professional group most closely identified with the renewal program, they 
were convenient targets in the scramble to apportion blame for the fiasco that 
urban renewal was suddenly considered to be. Yet, for those front-line planners who 
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were actually working on the renewal plans and projects - as well as for the 
municipal governments that employed them - it was as though they had been set 
-
up for a particularly vicious blindside check. For 20 years the government of r 
Canada and its agent, CMHC, had been dangling the carrot of federal grants before 
municipal governments, in the desire to persuade them that urban renewal was a 
socially responsible activity. Then, when they at last began to bite on the carrot 
with real gusto, it turned out to be poisoned bait. 
This turn of events could not possibly have been foreseen 10 years before. 
In 1958, the idea of a government-sponsored renewal program was still strange to 
most Canadian planners, which was why CMHC organized special courses of 
training. Momentum was beginning to build, though, and it was a time of much 
optimism for the planning movement. Under CMHC 's forceful leadership, urban 
renewal was enthusiastically accepted as one of the means by which a reinvigorated 
planning profession could contribute to Canada's bright promise. 
Against that backdrop, my purpose in this paper is to offer a preliminary, 
and necessarily brief, assessment of the Canadian experience with urban renewal from 
a physical planning perspective. I wm concentrate on two factors which combined to 
limit the effectiveness of the planners' contribution to the renewal program. These 
factors were, first, the discordance between the conceptions of urban renewal held 
by physical planners and the other key participants in the urban renewal program; 
and, second, the lag effect that is commonly associated with the design and 
implementation of public policies. In extreme cases, of which the Canadian urban 
renewal program seems to have been one, it can take so long to move from the 
recognition of a problem to remedial action that the circumstances that called forth 
the action will be utterly transformed. 
To develop these general ideas, the paper is organized into four sections. 
First, the main groups of actors in the urban renewal program are described; next, 
the main elements of the physical planning theory of urban renewal are sketched 
out; and then the most important events in the Canadian renewal program are 
interpreted in light of Gunton 's concept of the planning cycle. Finally, some 
implications for the relationship between planning theory and public policy will be 
developed. 
THE PRINCIPAL GROUPS OF ACTORS IN URBAN RENEWAL 
Since several distinctly different groups of actors were involved in the urban 
renewal program, all with their own perceptions of needs and appropriate responses, 
and since those perceptions were themselves likely to change in different ways over 
time, it follows that the changing interplay among the actors is crucial to any 
attempt to understand why events unfolded as they did. The basic pattern of 
relationships is illustrated in Figure l. Here, I have identified five main groups of 
actors, though I have further subdivided the two on which I particularly wish to 
concentrate - the planners and the politicians. The politicians also occupy the focal 
position in the diagram, since they alone had the authority to order urban renewal 
projects to be implemented. By the same token, they were subject to influence from 
all the other groups, whether through organized lobbying and protest, or through the 
formal channels of planning advisory services, or, more generally, through changes in 
the prevailing climate of opinion. 
A particularly important relationship, in terms of understanding the logic of 
the diagram, is that between politicians and housing reformers. The latter I regard 
as the true initiators of the urban renewal program, since they were the first to 
identify a problem and urge public action. The diagram is also designed to suggest 
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that the reformers had their greatest influence at the federal level, since the urban 
renewal program was given form through a series of national housing statutes, 
beginning in 1944. The provincial governments, by and large, were content to play a 
secondary role. There were exceptions, notably Ontario, but the main contribution of 
the provincial governments was to mediate between the other two levels. Because of 
the division of powers under the British North America Act, municipal governments 
were prevented from entering into agreements with the Government of Canada unless 
and until they had express sanction from the appropriate provincial government. 
Eventually, all the provinces adopted legislation to facilitate the participation of their 
municipalities in the urban renewal program. 
The actual implementation of urban renewal projects was entirely the 
responsibility of municipal governments. It was therefore their actions that had the 
most direct impact on the groups affected by renewal - the residents of the project 
areas and, to a lesser extent, those elements of the property industry for whom 
urban renewal afforded investment opportunities. It was also through the municipal 
governments that most of the planning work was done, from broad surveys of 
environmental conditions to the detailed design of new buildings and public facilities. 
Essentially, then, the planning profession's involvement with the urban renewal 
program was local and practical. The main exception was the staff of CMHC, who 
are also regarded as planners in Figure 1. Whether or not they were practicing 
members of the planning profession, they were in the best position to influence the 
development of national policy, in two respects: as advisors to Parliament they had 
a direct effect upon the evolution of the enabling legislation; and through their 
administrative procedures and regulations, they were able to govern the manner in 
which urban renewal projects of all kinds, in all parts of the country, were carried 
out. 
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In much the same way, planners working at the local level also served dual 
roles. Principally, they were technical advisors to government, but, like CMHC, 
municipal planning systems had their own administrative procedures which brought 
planners into direct relations with residents and property interests. For example, it 
became common practice to set up neighbourhood or project offices through which 
physical and social planners could provide immediate assistance to families with 
problems. On the other side of the coin, residents' difficulties were sometimes 
exacerbated by the planners' own well-intentioned diagnoses. This is the now-familiar 
problem of "planning blight", or the accelerated deterioration that is likely to result 
from uncertainty about an area's future - uncertainty that arises because the area is 
held in limbo, often for years, after it has first been identified as a target for 
renewal action. In extreme instances, such as the Don Vale and Trefann Court 
districts of Toronto, or Strathcona in Vancouver, the uncertainty provoked protest 
movements which eventually helped to bring about changes in local and national 
planning policy. 
The occurrence of planning blight can also be seen as evidence, at the local 
scale, of the lag between problem identification and action. It was at the national 
scale, however, that the lag effect was most acute, in the sense that it was a 
function of the complex process of reaching agreement on an appropriate policy 
response to a nation -wide problem, and then carrying that policy forward through a 
host of autonomous jurisdictions. Throughout the urban renewal program, federal 
government officials lamented their lack of authority over municipal governments, 
and the constitutional barrier that denied them the right to direct control over urban 
development policy. Still, the federal government did have money, and it was 
through the promise of generous financial aid that some 200 municipalities, from the 
very largest in Canada to the very smallest, were eventually persuaded to participate 
in the national renewal program. 
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THE PLANNING THEORY OF URBAN RENEWAL 
The idea that the urban fabric is in need of periodic renewal is an 
extremely old one in planning thought. Indeed, it is crucial to the ideal of 
environmental improvement which has provided the planning movement with its 
central inspiration. Yet it was not until the 1930s, when the British and American 
governments began to be active in slum clearance and housing assistance for 
low-income families, that a planning theory of renewal was consciously shaped. 
There had been earlier theoretical contributions, such as Geddes's concept of 
"conservative surgery" which became known later as area rehabilitation and gave rise, 
later still, to the neighbourhood improvement program in Canada. But the chief 
significance of the theoretical developments of the 1930s was their attempt to place 
the housing policy initiatives in the prevailing paradigm of urban planning. This was 
the so-called rational-compr_ehe_gsiv.!Lappr.oach,--m--whaLWebman •.. fPllo.wlng.~indJ?!Q!!!. 
has recently referred to as the. synoptic ideal. Indeed, the i4~ll! _of ~e~igg_1:l:J.igg_s_ 
~.llole so. ~s !() arrive at co_rnPl~~~--~s>lutions t() _p_r()~l~:£llS \Vas precisely what !1:1~ ... !~~ 
"urban renewal" was coined to capture, with specific reference to the .P!oble!l1_ of 
obsolescence in the urban environment. It was also axiomatic that comprehensive 
problem -solving depended on the principles of scientific inquiry, if the problems of 
environmental im:ro:.oxement were to be_ truly understood. 
ln Canada, the first definite statement of the comprehensive planning 
approach to the renewal of cities was published in 1935, in the chapter on housing 
that Humphrey Carver wrote for the League for Social Reconstruction, in Social 
Planning for Canada. The chapter begins immediately with the heading "Making 
town planning a reality". and the opening sentence establishes the link between 
housing and comprehensive planning: 
"When we come to the question of housing, the first essential is to 
7 
approach it with imagination and breadth of view - not as the restricted 
problem of clearing our worst slum areas or even of providing cheap 
'working class houses', but of planning and building better the urban 
environment in which so great a proportion of Canadians are born and 
live their daily lives". 
In the comprehensive planning view, it was a grievous error to attempt to 
solve housing ___ problems - or any _oth~_!_problems, for that_ matter __ __::__in is~lation. The 
slum housing problem was just one aspect of the global problem of improving the 
quality of the Canadian urban environment. That, in turn, could be broken down 
into two general classes of problems: first, ensuring that all "new" development 
(i.e. the conversion of raw land into urban use) should conform to acceptable 
standards of environmental quality; and, second, maintaining the quality of the 
existing environment and improving it where necessary. The latter, by definition, 
came to set the scope for urban renewal in planning theory. 
As general classes of problem, "new" development and "re" -development (as 
urban renewal was commonly known until the 1950s) were fundamentally different in 
their technical planning requirements. In terms of development policy, however, they 
were inseparable. Every city - or, better still, every city-region - was an essential 
whole, subject to a common set of pressures for growth and change. Whatever 
happened in one part was likely to affect other parts, and the problems of one 
part could not be solved without considering the implications for development 
elsewhere in the city and the city-region. 
Today, we can recognize that the early theoreticians of comprehensive 
planning were groping towards a systems view of the city, without the convenience 
of systems terminology in which to express themselves. What they did have - and 
its influence permeates the physical planning literature. on urban renewal until at 
8 
least the 1970s - was the social-ecological theory of the Chicago school of 
sociologists. McKenzie's formulation of the succession concept and Burgess's 
concentric zone concept were especially influential. The city was thought of as a 
dynamic organism, constantly changing and growing. In this process, it was inevitable 
that some parts would wear out or become obsolete - what planners came to refer 
to as physical and functional obsolescence. It was therefore natural and healthy that 
the urban organism should experience a continuous process of adaptation and 
regeneration. Equally, it was unhealthy for regeneration not to occur. Slums were 
the physical evidence of the urban organism's failure to renew itself. In the popular 
metaphor, which completed the biological analogy, slums were cancers. 
When these general notions were combined with the ideals of comprehensive 
planning, they gave shape to the basic concepts of the planning theory of urban 
renewal. These I will summarize under four points. 
(i) The scope of· comprehensive renewal planning 
To begin, a crucial distinction was made between those forms of renewal 
that occurred naturally or spontaneously in a healthy city and those that were called 
upon when the spontaneous processes failed. Both types of renewal required to be 
planned for, but in radically different ways. Spontaneous renewal would largely be 
carried out by individual entrepreneurs, Qr by public corporations acting in their own 
interest. The planning function would be to regulate or govern the renewal activities, 
to ensure that community standards of environmental quality were upheld. 
No_E -s~ renewal, by contrast, could be initiated only by government. Other 
interests might be enticed to join in at a later stage - indeed, the principles of 
citizen participation and co-operation between public and private enterprise were 
strongly emphasized - but in some situations government agencies would have to 
carry the entire responsibility. In theory, therefore, the need for 
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government-sponsored programs - which is all that the term "urban renewal" meant 
to everyone except physical planners - was restricted to those conditions with which 
Ql~- j)r()c;~~~~~-2[-~:e_ontaneous ren:'Wal weE_e unable to cope, -~t _ _l~st __ ig !!l_e 
~~oreseeable future. The distinction was essential if planning theory was to 
accommodate the free enterprise ethic, but it proved difficult to maintain in 
practice. The line between collective and individual interests became increasingly 
blurred, especially with respect to the revitalization of declining business districts. 
10 
----. ---~-·--
It also followed, as a close corollary, that the need for renewal planning 
was not restricted to the particular problem of bad housing conditions. To planners, 
it was axiomatic that obsolescence and deterioration could affect all types of land 
use and all functional facilities. A street system or a sewer system could readily 
become as unsafe as the worst houses, and business areas were as much at risk as 
residential areas of degenerating into slums. Unlike housing reformers or social 
planners, physical planners could not afford to focus on the residential slum 
problem as their professional specialty, because comprehensive planning theory 
required them to be concerned for the proper functioning of all parts of the city. 
In the words of one leading practitioner, urban renewal was best defined as "a 
planned process of reshaping the whole of the physical equipment of a city to meet 
present, and foreseeable future needs." That was actually written in 1965, but 
Carver had pointed in the same direction 30 years earlier. 
(ii) The principle of social neutrality in renewal planning 
In its philosophical bases, COJIDJiehensive planning theory combined a faith in 
--~---"------· ~ ---------- -------------------~----·-·-----··----··-~··---·· 
scientific objectivity with the belief that planning, as a social institution, should -
_,--~-·-·-----------,~-·~·,-- ~ ·- ~~~~ ~r-~•- ~---~~- ~ .-~- ~- -~- -~ --c~ 
serve the interests of the whole col11rJ11lnity. The planning conception of urban 
renewal had therefore to be couched in terms of an objectively determined public 
interest, not the special needs or "rights" of a select group. It does not follow that 
individual planners did not genuinely wish to help the less fortunate, but the 
planning theory of renewal could not depend on a prescribed vision of social 
reform. Instead, the theory had to be socially neutral. 
It was on this point, most fundamentally, that the physical planning 
conception of renewal diverged from that of the housing reformers and social 
planners, and through them, to at least some extent, the politicians. The planners' 
distance from the reform cause also allowed them to avoid the intellectual quagmire 
that reformers found themselves in, when they came to justify their desire for 
public action. For generations, the reform movement was bedevilled by the "habits 
of the people" hypothesis, which said, in effect, that slums were created by slum 
dwellers. Ecological theory provided an objective counter to that charge, since it 
explained slums as logical outcomes of impersonal economic and social forces that 
were constantly re-ordering the city. But the ecological explanation did not, of itself, 
provide a rationale for government efforts to interrupt the slum -forming processes. 
On the contrary, slums were described as transitional areas which, in the very long 
term, would be absorbed into expanding business districts, while new slums were 
forming further out. This rather put the reformers in the position of King Canute. 
In general, there were two kinds of response. In the first, a deterministic 
one, improved housing was presented as a benefit to society. Very crudely, it was 
said that slum residents would become better people and lead better lives, and so 
the community at large would be better. The report of the Lieutenant-Governor's 
Committee on housing conditions in Toronto in 1934 provided a good illustration of 
this logic. The second response might be called the natural justice argument. Here, 
it was claimed that all citizens had a right to a "decent" standard of housing, and 
it was the responsibility of the state to define the minimum acceptable standard and 
11 
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to ensure that it was met. This principle was enshrined in the preamble to the 
American Housing Act of 1949, and it has been implicit in all Canadian urban 
renewal legislation as well. 
Physical planners were naturally influenced by these ideas, but physical 
-----------~----···-----·-·--------------·-···---·-·-···-------
planning theory, J:ly ~Lrt!!~. of its focus on environmental improvement rather than _ _;;_~:;:c.::~:;-= ~-0" Y 
. .. ··-·····- ···-··------------·--······· .. ·--~.,-- -~ ::C•.c_. 
social impr~~n:t~I11,_ yvas able to re~()~!_to a J:!!Ore _ d~~~~e~,_ _"objectiv~-~ view. Yet 
~j '-' 
the theory was by no means devoid of moral assumptions. In particular, the rights 
of private property were a central problem for the renewal concept, and had a 
major influence on the way in which collective action was justified under planning 
theory. Public renewal projects inevitably required that ownership rights be curtailed 
or even extinguished. If the canons of co.m.prehensi-¥e-.planning___w_e.r.e_t.o_Q.e_:r:es.p.e.cted 
in the process, it had to be possible to demonstrate that the renewal action was 
necessary to the good of the greater community. In American terms, the action had 
to be a defensible exercise of the constitutional police power. ¥ore generally, 
however, the public interest in urban renewal was identified in the conventional 
- . -~--~-~ .. ----------------~- --·-~----·-~~~--~~··<»---···----·~-
language of utilitarianism, wl_lich has long provided the planning movement _With _ _its 
--------·-------·-·· ·~--------·-----------~ ~--·--·------------~-~--------·---~~-~-~·----"« 
ethical rationale. J__!!.t __ I!l()S! ___ si~;e!Y:, ~lll_IIlS were_'!_~!~f!!l_~nd_j_Il~ffic:ient~. They were 
destructive of health and happiness; they constituted an unproductive use of valuable 
urban land; and they absorbed grossly disproportionate shares of municipal 
government expenditures while generating little tax revenue of their own. These 
became the basic public interest criteria by which planners sought to defend 
wholesale interference with private property rights under the urban renewal program. 
(iii) ·Planning for progressive stages of obsolescence 
From social-ecological theory it was understood that environmental 
deterioration, or "blight" as it was commonly known, was a continuous process in a 
dynamic city. It was also understood that blight progressed through a series of 
stages, so at any given time it was to be expected that areas in different parts of 
a city would show different degrees of blight. A comprehensive approach to renewal 
planning required that there should be an appropriate package of planning techniques 
for every stage. The techniques had also to be devised to operate on an area-wide 
basis, as the processes of blight did. A piecemeal approach was the antithesis of 
comprehensiveness, and in the case of urban renewal was open to the special hazard 
of externality effects. If some features of a blighted area were improved while 
others were not, it was feared that the improvements would quickly be vitiated. 
The theoretical response was to conceive of three general classes of renewal 
action, known as conservation, rehabilitation and redevelopment. The last, like 
old-fashioned slum clearance, was taken to mean that all, or virtually all, of a 
designated area should be demolished and something new constructed on the site. 
Redevelopment was obviously the most extreme form of renewal action and was 
envisaged to apply to areas of most advanced deterioration. This did not necessarily 
mean that every building had to be unsalvageable, but the area as a whole was to 
be of such poor quality that it would not be worth trying to save individual 
buildings. It was thought they would detract from the overall quality of the 
redeveloped environment. 
In theory, then, redevelopment was designed for areas where the blighting 
process had effectively run its course. Rehabilitation and conservation, by contrast, 
were directed at areas where blight was still extremely active or was threatening to 
become active. Area rehabilitation was essentially intended to reverse the progress of 
blight before it had gone too far; area conservation aimed to prevent or suppress 
blight before it had fairly begun. Under a rehabilitation program, buildings would be 
repaired and modernized, and community services would be upgraded, along with 
13 
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environmental amenities of all kinds. Spot redevelopment could also be tolerated, in 
the interest of area improvement, but it was clearly envisaged that most of the 
original buildings would be retained. The same was true of conservation areas, but 
there it was to be a matter of maintaining environmental quality rather than 
restoring it. The chief technique of conservation planning was code enforcement, or 
the use of building and occupancy by-laws to compel delinquent property owners to 
meet desired standards of maintenance and to prevent overcrowding. Concurrently, 
the adoption of an area conservation plan was expected to commit the municipal 
government to maintain its own facilities and services at an acceptable level. 
(iv) Comprehensive survey and analvsis for renewal renewal planning 
In addition to providing a logical explanation for the blight that was 
~l 
I 
all-too-evident in Canadian cities, and an objective basis for the design of planning 
strategies, social-ecological theory was thought to have predictive power. This was 
extremely important, since it provided physical planners with a scientific basis for 
the interpretation of future development trends and their effects on the total urban 
environment. In the preparation of a comprehensive renewal plan, it was not enough 
to identify some problem area as being immediately in need of remedial action. 
Rather, it was necessary to consider how all parts of the city were likely to change 
in relation to all other parts, and to determine from that the kinds of renewal 
action that were most appropriate to each area in the long run. Priorities had to 
be established as well, certainly for those renewal areas on which public funds 
would have to be spent, and planning theory required the system of priorities to be 
a rational one. 
It was also axiomatic. in the comprehensive planning view, that long-term 
renewal needs should be determined in relation to all other long-term development 
needs. In the well-planned city, the renewal plan would be but one component of 
the comprehensive plan, inseparable from the transportation plan, the public facilities 
plan, and so on. Above all, the renewal plan had to be consistent with the land 
use plan, since the determination of the most appropriate future uses is the most 
basic decision in any renewal project. Thus, Carver, in his 1935 essay, used 
Burgess's transition zone concept to argue that slum residents should be relocated to 
suburban communities, since business redevelopment would normally represent the best 
long-term use of inner-city land. Here, once again, physical planners were likely to 
be at odds with other groups of actors in the renewal process. Since the latter's 
interest was generally fixed on the housing problem, they tended to think solely in 
terms of residential areas being renewed for low-income housing. 
The larger implication for the theory of the planning process was that the 
decision to undertake renewal action should always be preceded by the most careful, 
comprehensive analysis of development needs and environmental conditions. Ideally, a 
city's general renewal plan would have been prepared as an integral part of the 
comprehensive plan; but at the very least, if there was no general land use plan in 
force, a comprehensive renewal study would be required. This would assess the 
long-term renewal needs of the entire city and set a framework for the preparation 
of more detailed plans for the areas of highest priority. In comprehensive planning 
theory, this was the most rational way to proceed. 
THE PL~G CYCLE OF THE URBAN 
RENEWAL PROGRAM 
As in other countries where urban renewal became a major public activity in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Canadian program marked a climax: in a long-rising wave 
of concern. Unfortunately for renewal planners, however, the crest of the planning 
15 
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effort coincided with a radical re-appraisal of the need for urban renewal. Major 
changes in public policy eventually flowed from this, giving rise, in turn, to a 
substantial re-orientation of planning activity. Ironically. the "new" policy had always 
been a prime concept in the comprehensive planning theory of urban renewal, but 
that underlines the significance of the effect that conceptual discordance had upon 
the renewal program, especially when combined with the lag between problem 
identification and policy implementation. 
Space does not permit me to develop this interpretation in depth, since it is 
impossible to describe the full course of events in the detail that would be required. 
Instead, by employing Gunton's diagram of the planning cycle (Figure 2). I hope 
to be able to bring out those highlights that bore directly upon the contribution of 
physical planning theory to the urban renewal program. As it happens, Gunton 's 
sequence of steps does not fit exactly with the actual sequence of urban renewal 
events in Canada, but the general logic of a two-phase cycle certainly holds true. 
Above all, the most intense problem -solving effort, as measured by the volume of 
planning studies and the number of projects being implemented, came at a time 
when the inappropriateness of the established policies was widely conceded. There 
were many reasons for that, but the one I wish to emphasize. following Gunton's 
terminology. is the changing form of the problem that had to be solved. 
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that urban renewal policy 
was initially conceived in terms of the problem of bad housing conditions.\ It was 
\ 
intended to address the needs of those Canadians who were living in houses that 
were thought to be unsafe and unhealthy. This could mean that they were in poor 
repair, or that they were inadequately equipped for personal comfort and hygiene, 
or (perhaps the greatest threat of all) they were too crowded to permit decent 
family life. In general. too, as conveyed by the almost invariable use of the word 
.I 
J 
-I 
~ 
m 
INTENSITY OF PROBLEM AND 
and 
INTENSITY OF PROBLEM SOLVING EFFORT 
Problem emerges 
F-ubllc recogn1t1on of problem 
Polatacal pressure grows 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
AnalySIS of Problem . 
Formulataon of poilc1es 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
v 
. 
. 
I mplementat1on strategy developement 
Pohcaes 1mplemented after 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-·-. . 
. 
. 
Problem already dess1pates or changes form 
Pollctes mon1tored 
Pohctes no longer relevant 
Problem emerges 
. 
-· 
·. 
·. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-------~ 
.. 
.. ·· 
.· 
.· 
LIBRARY 
. 
. · 
fNSTlTUTE OF URBAN STUDIES 
UNTVERSITY OF WINNIPEG 
. · 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
z z 
-1 -1 
m m 
z z 
(f) (f) 
-1 -1 
-< -< 
0 0 
-I 11 11 I 
-o -o m JJ JJ 
0 0 
-o ~ OJ OJ r 
'""' r r )> m m 
~ ~ z 
(f) z 
-0 z 
r G) < 
z () ~ 
G) 
-< 
m () 
11 r 11 m 0 
JJ 
-1 
"slum", bad housing conditions were thought to be concentrated in areas that lacked 
the amenities of healthy community life. It was at this point that the housing 
problem became an urban planning problem as well. 
Over a period of some 40 years, from the 1890s to the 1930s, there were 
brief flares of reform enthusiasm in various Canadian cities. Then, between 1934 
and 1944, under the dual impact of the depression and wartime constraints on new 
house building, a sense of real emergency began to appear. Local commissions of 
inquiry were set up - in Toronto in 1934, Montreal in 1935, and St. John's in 
1943 - and the incidence of poor housing and environmental conditions was 
increasingly remarked upon in municipal reports and plans. National investigations 
were undertaken as well, first by the Special Commons Committee on Housing in 
1935, then by the Rowell-Sirois Commission in 1939, and finally by the Advisory 
Committee on Reconstruction in 1944. The last, in the Report of the Subcommittee 
on Ho~sing and Community Planning,_:was_res_ponsible for the single Illo~~ impo~_ 
~~Cl1IIl~nt __ iE: __ !!J:~J1!.§1Q:rY_()f _G_@I!Qi~!!_J'lang!gg-=-- In the present cont~xt!____tt_ was 
particularlL__notable _fQ:r ___ !P-ree things: it treated housing and community planning as 
---~- .. ~"--·--------~-,------------------------ ~---
inseparable social needs; it assumed tl:l~t __ tl:l~-- sta!_e was obliged to ensure that 
,__,_, __ • ~ ,-•• ~ • _,_ • ••··~-•••~~··-~~-<-»•"-''~--•·' ' ' ' -~ -~~-"~~ •• ~w•»·•~·~·~···~-- --•-•w••-·•~~~~~-~~--?-•~r••~.....-~-~-~-
low-i?c~~~-_f~!i~§_ \Ver~ ___ p:rgyided ___ with .. d~~ptJiving __ ~n.YitQJ:lfl1~!!~L-122.~---i?~-!Q~g 
homes and in their communities; and it_established,irL~m(l,l!f>tiY~--Q.~J;.<lil,_Jb.e 
seriousness of the problem of bad housing condition§ __ !£_ Ca11~da. Beyond that, the 
ideals of decent housing and well-planned communities were firmly linked to the 
Advisory Committee's larger vision of a national system of social security. 
With this report, the fourth of Gunton 's initial stages was brought to an 
end. The stage of policy formulation began immediately after, in the National 
Housing Act of 1944 and the Act to create the Central Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation in 1945. As an urban renewal measure the 1944 Act was_ extremely 
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limited, but it did establish the federal government's willingness to contribute 
financially to the clearance of slum land, on condition that the use after 
redevelopment was "in accordance or in harmony with an official community plan". 
There was further provision, in Part V of the Act, for the government "to cause 
investigations" to be made into housing conditions and community planning needs. 
CMHC later used this authority to persuade the cities of Montreal and Toronto to 
undertake systematic analyses of their environmental problems. Then, in 1956, Part 
V was amended by adding a clause that empowered CMHC to enter into agreements 
with municipal and provincial governments to share the costs of having urban 
renewal studies prepared. This resulted in an immediate flurry of planning activity, 
with 50 studies being authorized over the next 8 years. 
These procedures were clearly designed to ensure that a scientific approach 
would be taken to the preparation of urban renewal plans. They were also matched 
by substantive policy changes that served to move the legislation progressively closer 
to the expectations of the planning theory of urban renewal. Initially, in the 1944 
Act, cleared sites had to be sold to limited dividend corporations or to life 
insurance companies for the construction of rental housing. That was modified in 
1953, by the addition of a clause permitting cleared sites to be used "for any 
federal, provincial or municipal public purpose", as long as an alternative site was 
made available elsewhere for the construction of an equivalent amount of rental 
housing. Further small but significant changes were made in 1954, when the word 
"slum" was dropped in favour of "blighted or substandard areas", and in 1956, 
when the term "housing redevelopment" was replaced by "urban redevelopment". 
These changes all pointed to a broadening of the urban renewal concept, although, 
as befitted a housing statute, the emphasis was still on the provision of good 
quality housing for people of low income. If anything, that emphasis was reinforced 
in 1953 when public housing projects, to be financed through federal-provincial 
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partnerships, were added to the list of permitted uses for redevelopment sites. The 
effect was immediate. Of the 20 urban renewal projects approved between 1948 and 
mid -1964, 12 included federal-provincial housing, whereas only one (Regent Park 
North in Toronto) was financed by a local housing authority. 
The convergence of planning theory and urban renewal legislation became 
most nearly complete in 1964, in a further set of amendments to the National 
Housing Act. In summary, five main changes were made: "urban redevelopment" at 
last became "urban renewal"; the requirement that renewal plans should satisfy the 
conditions of the comprehensive planning process was made even more explicit; a 
new type of renewal plan was provided for, in the detailed urban renewal schemes 
that were to follow from a general urban renewal study; and all limitations on the 
re-use of project sites were removed, as long as "decent, safe and sanitary housing 
accommodation" was made available to displaced families. Finally, municipal 
governments were encouraged to plan for area rehabilitation and conservation as well 
as for redevelopment, although the provisions for financial assistance from the 
federal government were still geared overwhelmingly to redevelopment. This point was 
soon to assume great significance. 
In addition to these legislative changes, CMHC and the government of the 
day intensified their efforts to persuade municipal governments to participate in the 
urban renewal program. The result was dramatic. Over a span of 8 or 9 years 
after the amending statute was adopted, more than 150 urban renewal studies were 
completed, along with 150 urban renewal schemes. Ninety of these led to renewal 
projects being approved for implementation. 
In Gunton 's terms, the peak of the problem -solving effort occurred in the 
years 1966 through 1969. There was then a rapid decline in the early 1970s. This 
was a direct consequence of the appointment in 1968 of the Federal Task Force on 
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Housing and Urban Development, and the decision by its chairman, Paul Hellyer, 
the minister responsible for housing, to order a temporary halt to the government's 
aid program. The halt became an official termination the next year, after the Task 
Force's report was handed down. Further grants were authorized in the period 
1969-1972, but only in cases where prior commitments remained to be honoured. 
Several considerations entered into this abrupt about-face. For one, the 
federal government suddenly realized how expensive it would be to implement all the 
urban renewal projects that were then envisaged. For another, renewal proposals 
were becoming a cause of much conflict in some cities, and there was growing 
evidence -of resistance to the personal and social costs that redevelopment, in 
particular, entailed. There was also a growing unease about the range of 
non-residential projects that were being undertaken in the name of urban renewal, 
and even the residential projects were not universally admired, particularly the public 
housing schemes that had been constructed on several of the early redevelopment 
sites. Most basically, however, the housing "problem" of the 1960s was not that of 
the 1930s and 1940s. The central issue was no longer housing conditions but 
affordability. To a large extent, the problem of poor housing had been solved by 
spontaneous renewal, as a consequence of the post-war growth of Canadian cities 
and the increasing affluence of the population. The ceRsus of 1961 recorded a 
striking improvement over 1951, and that trend continued, more modestly, through 
the next decade. 
From 1966 on, talk of a new housing "crisis" was rampant. For the first 
time in many years there was serious concern that the housing supply in Canada 
was not able to match demand, chiefly because of a rapid increase in housing costs 
and prices. It came to be feared that larger and larger segments of the population 
would be denied the opportunity of home-ownership, and thus denied one of their 
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most basic rights as Canadians. The problem was compounded by the continuing 
erosion of the low-cost housing supply, in a period of large-scale reconstruction of 
inner-city areas. The public renewal program contributed comparatively little to that 
erosion, but it was a highly visible contribution. "Urban renewal" therefore came to 
be seen as part of the "problem". 
This negative perception was enhanced by an insight that planners were able 
to offer from their growing body of local research and experience. When urban 
renewal policy was first framed, the conventional wisdom held that people who lived 
in poor houses would normally be tenants, which also brought the villainous image 
of the slum landlord into play. In fact, most of the prospective renewal areas 
proved to have high proportions of owners-occupiers, which cast an altogether 
different light on the morality of public renewal projects, and on the most 
appropriate strategy of renewal. If home-ownership was a national ideal, what public 
good was served by forcing low-income families to give up such houses as they had 
managed to acquire? - especially if the official alternative was a rent-to-income 
apartment in a public housing project. 
As a matter of social morality, the question was one for politicians to 
answer, not physical planners. Nor was comprehensive planning theory of much help, 
except where it could be demonstrated that environmental conditions were so bad as 
to threaten the well-being of the whole community. By the 1960s, however, that was 
not the case anywhere in Canada. Probably there never had been extensive areas 
that truly deserved to be labelled "slums", and the worst concentrations, by and 
large, were dealt with in the earliest redevelopment projects. The urban renewal 
studies consistently depicted a pattern of blighted areas in which buildings of 
different quality were mixed, more or less indiscriminantly. 
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T h e  p r a c t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n ,  a s  p l a n n e r s  w e l l  u n d e r s t o o d ,  w a s  t h a t  a r e a  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  w a s  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  s t r a t e g y  o f  r e n e w a l  p l a n n i n g  f o r  t h o s e  a r e a s  
o f  C a n a d i a n  c i t i e s  w h e r e  b l i g h t  w a s  i n  p r o g r e s s .  R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  w a s  a l s o  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  
t h a n  r e d e v e l o p m e n t  t o  a r e a s  w h e r e  m o s t  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  w e r e  o w n e r - o c c u p i e r s ,  s i n c e  
i t  i m p l i e d  a  p r o g r a m  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  e n a b l e  o w n e r s  t o  u p g r a d e  t h e i r  
p r o p e r t i e s .  S m a l l  r e d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o j e c t s  c o u l d  s t i l l  b e  a c c o m m o d a t e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  a r e a s  o f  b a d  h o u s i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  b u t  i f  t h e  r e n e w a l  s c h e m e  w a s  
c o n c e i v e d  a t  s o m e  l a r g e r  s c a l e ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  n e i g h b o u r h o o d ,  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  h a d  t o  b e  
t h e  d o m i n a n t  f o c u s .  
T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  i n  t h e  C a n a d i a n  p l a n n i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  u r b a n  r e n e w a l ,  
t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a r e a  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  w a s  a  c o n s t a n t  t h e m e .  I t  e m e r g e d  i n  a l m o s t  a l l  
t h e  u r b a n  r e n e w a l  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  p e r i o d ,  a n d  l e d ,  i n  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s ,  t o  d e t a i l e d  
a n a l y s e s  o f  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  n e e d s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s .  S e v e r a l  o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  r e n e w a l  p r o j e c t s  
u n d e r  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t  w e r e  a r e a  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  w h i c h  i n c o r p o r a t e d  v a r y i n g  
a m o u n t s  o f  l o c a l i z e d  r e d e v e l o p m e n t ;  e x a m p l e s  w e r e  L o w e r  T o w n  E a s t  i n  O t t a w a ,  
A l e x a n d r a  P a r k  i n  T o r o n t o ,  a n d  L a  p e t i t e  B o u r g o g n e  i n  M o n t r e a l .  
T h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  l e a d  t o  a n  o b v i o u s  q u e s t i o n :  I f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a r e a  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  w a s  s o  s t r o n g l y  a c c e p t e d  i n  p l a n n i n g  t h e o r y  a n d  p r a c t i c e ,  w h y  w a s  i t  
n o t  t r a n s l a t e d  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n t o  u r b a n  r e n e w a l  p o l i c y ,  b e a r i n g  i n  m i n d  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  t h a t  C M H C  ' s  p l a n n e r s  h a d  u p o n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  h o u s i n g  
l e g i s l a t i o n ?  T h e  a n s w e r ,  s o m e w h a t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 6 4  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  
t h o u g h t  t o  h a v e  d o n e  a l l  t h a t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y .  " T h e r e  i s  n o w  a  f o c u s  o n  c o n s e r v i n g  
a n d  r e h a b i l i t a t i n g  w h a t  i s  w o r t h  k e e p i n g , "  s a i d  H u m p h r e y  C a r v e r ,  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  
t h e  C M H C  A d v i s o r y  G r o u p ,  i n  1 9 6 5 .  A n d  S t a n l e y  P i c k e t t ,  C M H C ' s  A d v i s o r  o n  
U r b a n  R e n e w a l ,  d e s c r i b e d  a t  s o m e  l e n g t h  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  1 9 6 4  A c t  p r o v i d e d .  W i t h  t h e  b l e s s i n g  o f  h i n d s i g h t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  
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can only be said that CMHC's intentions were obscured by the language of the 
statute. Not until the urban renewal legislation was rewritten in the amended 
National Housing Act of 1973 was the concept of area rehabilitation clearly 
described, under the new title of neighbourhood improvement. 
These events were most unfortunate as far as the planning profession was 
concerned, and their consequences were not a little unfair. In the political 
announcements that attended the amended legislation, it was made to appear that a 
totally new approach had been devised, an approach so new that it could not be 
associated with the old concept of urban renewal, all references to which were 
deleted from the statute. Yet, in reality. the 1973 amendments did not represent a 
rejection of the principle of government-sponsored urban renewal; rather, they were 
a retreat from the principle of comprehensiveness. Just as the original Act of 1944 
had conceived of renewal in the narrow sense of slum clearance for the purpose of 
building rental housing for low-income families, so the 1973 amendments conceived 
of renewal in the equally narrow sense of the rehabilitation of deteriorating 
neighbourhoods. 
That there were good reasons for the policy reorientation goes without 
saying. On the one hand, as planners had been pointing out for years, there were 
no large areas in Canadian cities that were in need of comprehensive redevelopment. 
All that was really necessary was to provide assistance for small-scale or "spot" 
redevelopment within larger rehabilitation areas, a need that was provided for in the 
neighbourhood improvement legislation in 1973. On the other hand, the use of 
housing legislation to sponsor urban renewal projects that had little, if any. housing 
purpose was dubious. to say the least. Non -residential projects proved to be very 
popular with municipal governments, and commercial and industrial renewal was no 
less desirable than residential renewal, but some other legislative vehicle would have 
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been more appropriate. In effect, the government had attempted to use its housing 
legislation to assume a leading role in the much larger field of urban development 
policy. Unhappily, in the public furore that accompanied its eventual retreat from 
that position, it was made to appear that it was really the planners who had got 
it all wrong, in their conception of comprehensive urban renewal. 
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